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"(3) If police 'practices of this nature are to be legally sanctioned, what limitations should be imposed?
"(4) With respect to police arrest statutes generally, should
more freedom be granted to the police in recognition
of their contentions that existing laws are obsolete and
hamper police attempts to meet the public demand for
'
adequate police protection? 2

The impact of the book in its entirety is highly effective.
Although at times individual papers, particularly in the foreign
law section, seem to be unduly concerned with the minutiae of
rule, and lose contact somewhat with broader policy considerations, generally the book successfully pursues its objective"the quest for balance." The inclusion of foreign law commentaries is certainly appropriate, for, as suggested by Justice Black
in his concurring opinion in Rochin v. California, the search for
the balance "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" is not
the exclusive concern of the people of the English-speaking
world. This fine book is an articulate witness to the magnificent
contribution which Northwestern University's School of Law
has long made in the areas of evidence and criminal procedure,
and thus a most appropriate outgrowth of its centennial celebration.
George W. Pugh*

A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland, by T. B. Smith,
Q.C., D.C.L., LL.D., F.B.A., Professor of Civil Law in the
University of Edinburgh. (Edinburgh: W. Green & Son,
Ltd. 1962. xx and 865 and (appendices, tables and index)
112 pp.)
Also published as:
Scotland: The Development of its Laws and Constitution, by T.
B. Smith, Q.C., D.C.L., LL.D., F.B.A., Professor of Civil Law
in the University of Edinburgh. (London: Stevens & Sons,
Ltd. The British Commonwealth-The Development of its
2. POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM -THE
(Sowle ed. 1962).
3. 342 U.S. 165, 175-76 (1952).
4. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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Laws and Constitutions, Vol. 11. 1962. xx and 865 and (appendices, tables and index) 112 pp.)
Scotland and Louisiana, Quebec and South Africa have this
in common, that the basic Romanism of their law, variously
mediated, has been materially affected by that of England, dominant or irredentist. Of the four, Scotland is the most precarious.
Like South Africa, it has failed to give definitive form to its
law by means of codification, but whereas that Republic has
control of its own courts and a law-making body apt to do the
will of the nation, Scotland's statutes come from a legislature
where Scots are outnumbered 559 to 71, and its civil appeals go
to a tribunal where a majority of the judges are strangers to the
law they profess to administer. Scotland is not, then, in matters
of law, clearly the master of her fate.
The situation, indeed, is so critical that one is weakly tempted to regard the cause as lost. There are very good grounds for
not doing so. Secondary grounds are that the law of Scotland,
based on principle rather than precedent, is fitter for progress
than English law; that Scotland should have a system whose
morality is overt rather than surreptitious; that a world largely
divided between the civilian and the common law should retain
some examples of their interaction; and, on aesthetic grounds,
that "either oil or water is preferable to the unsatisfactory
emulsion which results from attempts to mix the two."' The
principal reason, however, concerns the continued existence of
the Scots as a distinguishable nation. That they presently feel
themselves to be different from the English is an undeniable
social fact, although they have no separate language in which
to express and confirm their distinctiveness. This being so, it
would surely be sad to allow to disappear from the Family of
Nations a group which has contributed to civilization, inter alia,
the first significant Declaration of Independence, an endless
stream of missionaries, colonists and administrators, some great
moral phliosophy, a familiar beverage, and one Very Romantic
Queen. But since a group which can individuate itself only with
reference to history is sure to founder in fain~ant archaism, it
is essential that some vital institutions remain to which the
Scottish consciousness may attach itself. There are only two
candidates - the Church of Scotland, already threatened from
within by the ecumenical movement, and the Law of Scotland,
1. LORD CooPER
COMMENTARY 666.
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which has been increasingly darkened by the malign shadow
from the south. On Scotland's law depends her soul.
In such a crisis it is proper for the committed scholar to appear as the herald, to speak in the imperative rather than the
indicative, and to sound the call to arms even by means of a
Commentary on the Law. Indeed, a commentary is an ideal medium, directed as it is to the young on whose eventual stance the
case depends. Since it is the law as it is which is in imbalance,
such a commentary should not be expected to give a balanced
view of it. It will be manifesto scholarship, but it need be none
the less scholarship and may be all the more interesting for that
reason. The cry of the manifesto will be not revolution but return. "Scotland has too often gone awhoring after strange gods,
and . . .the time is ripe to return to the juristic altars of our
fathers."'2 So Professor Smith puts it, and admirably sustains
his case in an excellently exciting and illuminating book. If it
fails to have effect, the cause was already lost.
Readers of this Review may well be surprised at the appearance of a single-volume commentary on the whole law of a jurisdiction. There are both historical and contemporary justifications for books of this type. They derive from the publications
of the institutional writers (Stair, Erskine and Bell for private
law) whose works have primary authority in Scotland; and they
are used as a guide by students following the compendious
course in Scots Law offered by the Universities of Scotland. In
fact, since this publication is to be complemented by a volume
on Industrial and Mercantile Law by Professor Gow of McGill
University, Professor Smith does not deal at any length with
such topics as insolvency, corporations, and the particular contracts, but he does include, in addition to valuable chapters on
the history and sources of Scots law and illuminating notes on
the legal profession and education in Scotland, such parts of
constitutional law as are specifically referable to Scotland, criminal law and procedure, family law, succession, property, and
obligations.
This book, as the dual form of its publication indicates, is
directed both to students in Scottish Universities and to readers
abroad who want to discover what Scots law is about. Since
readers of both classes will in any case have to refer to the
standard treatises for a full treatment of any specific point of
2. P. 616.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIV

law in which they are interested, a work like this should not try
to be a pocket Corpus or a portable library. Nor need space be
devoted to subjects in proportion to their practical importance.
The first essential is that it should be interesting, the second
that it should deal in sufficient detail with those topics which
are central to the system, not in the sense that they provide the
bulk of litigation but in that they neatly illuminate the method
and genius of the law. In both essentials Professor Smith
triumphs.
Examples of such topics are the generalized principle of liability for fault in delict (as opposed to the directional duty in
Bourhill v. Young,3 and the rule that pecuniary damage inflicted
by non-physical means is non-compensable (Candler v. Crane,
Christmas,4 now overruled by Hedley, Byrne v. Heller 5)), the
generalized principle of unjustified enrichment, the ius quaesiturn tertio, the principle of abuse of rights exemplified in property relations by the law of aemulatio vicini, and the unilateral
promise or pollicitation. Each of these crucial subjects is treated
with great care and lucidity; thus in summing up the differences between the Scots law of 'error and the English law of
mistake the author observes "Civilian systems are less concerned
with the dishonesty of defenders than with the vitiated consent
of pursuers seeking relief on such terms as the courts may think
just." This is fine. However, the author is so keen to maximize the differences of Scots law that he tends to emphasize
the principle at the expense of pointing out the limits of its application. So he takes a very wide view of the obligation of
recompense, which certainly needs to be carefully restricted, and
he suggests no exceptions to the principle that a person causing
damage by culpa should respond in damages. While it is true
that fundamental principles must be restated when they show
signs of being submerged by specific decisions, students need
some indication of how these principles work in practice. Petere
fontes is fine; but we also need a view of the course of the river.
In one case at least, the author does not draw all the consequences from the principle he adopts; he embraces the doctrine
of subjective test of intention in homicide, but would convict
the man whose unreasonable mistake prevented the formation
of that intention.
3.
4.
5.
6.

[1943] A.C. 92 (Scot.).
[1951] 2 K.B. 164 (C.A.).
[1963] 3 WEEKLY L. REV. 101 (H.L.).
P. 810.
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The Louisiana lawyer will be particularly interested in the
chapter on trusts, in which Professor Smith clearly shows that
this institution is not dependent on a bifurcation of jurisdictions
nor yet on a splitting of ownership; Scotland's very flexible
trust developed from the principles of mandate and deposit plus
change of title, and appears to use the principle of unjust enrichment for such tracing of trust property as is permitted. He
will note, too, that the legislature succeeded as early as 1449
in transforming the personal contract of lease into a real right
by means of an act for the relief of "puir tennentes." The
author's observations on the law of defamation should also be
of interest in a civilian jurisdiction which has had some trouble
with that delict; Scots law recognizes an action for solatium
based on insult (which need not be published to third parties)
as well as one based on injury to reputation for patrimonial damage (which must be proved). Further, the author sees the possibility of basing an action for invasion of privacy either on the
nominate delict of contumelia, or on the general principle of liability for harm caused animo injuriandi.
In a work which gives a conspectus of such a large part of
the law, structure is extremely important. The rival publication,
Gloag & Henderson's Introduction to the Law of Scotland, contains forty-nine equiparated chapters in no rational order, but
Professor Smith has obviously given a great deal of thought to
the matter, and the result, though unorthodox, has much to
recommend it. Thus he contrives to produce a "general part"
to the private law in which he distinguishes contract from conveyance and acts (juristic and illicit) from facts, as well as discussing good faith (which, however, does not appear in the
Table of Contents). In the main body of private law succession
appears sensibly between family law and property, trusts between property and obligations. The last category is treated in
the order quasi-contract, strict liability, delict and voluntary
obligations. It might be suggested that quasi-contract (restitution and recompense) should come at the end, both because it is
really subsidiary remedy and because it is difficult (especially
if it operates after the reduction of a contract relatively null)
to understand its function until the area of operation of voluntary and delictal obligations has been traversed. Despite such
trivial objections, the author is to be congratulated for his efforts and for their success. Even in codified countries students
often have difficulty in seeing the legal system as a map rather
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than a list; for Scottish students it must hitherto have been
impossible.
The author is very insistent on terminology, sometimes with
good reason, sometimes without. Thus it is irksome to find him
interpolating "(sc. delictual)" after the term "tortious" in a
United Kingdom statute; nor need he have added, either in text
or footnote, the explanation "anglic6 execution" quite every time
he refers to diligence, especially as he leaves the difficult sentence "Housebreaking is not itself a point of dittay" without
elucidation; nor can any good come of trying to describe breach
of statutory duty as "quasi-delict." On the other hand, he is
wise to discourage the use of the terms "void" and "voidable"
in contractual matters, since their use would facilitate the continued importation of English cases which use those terms with
un-Scottish results; again, "culpa" in the sense of fault must be
distinguished from that use of the word negligence which signifies a complete cause of action in tort; and it is interesting to
learn how the Scottish actio injuriarum,used by the relatives of
one wrongously killed by the defender, differs from the process
of the same name used by the Romans. The author's fascination
by terms will provide collateral pleasure for the reader who enjoys Sir Walter Scott. He will be delighted to discover the servitude known as "Fuel, Feal and Divot," still the cause of unneighborly dispute in the Crofting Counties; he will learn to disapprove murmuring judges, stouthrief and hamesucken (visiting a man's home to beat him up), and to distinguish spuilzie
from tailzie. For all his pride in his heritage, however, Professor Smith must not be taken for Gothic; he advocates a modern
use of the fertile old principles, and it is for their unprogressive
effect that he condemns the accretions from abroad.
Professor Smith would resent the charge that he is unbiased;
no missionary is. Too obvious a tendentiousness, however, may
weaken what is otherwise well said. For example, although he
does admit the confusion of Scots law on the constitution of
formal obligations and the formal means of proving other obligations, he might, without weakening his case, have admitted
that England has dealt much more satisfactorily than Scotland
with the question of the liability of a hospital for its medical
staff. Odium Anglorum is a proper adjunct of Scots pride, but
while it usually provokes noble wrath, it occasionally leads the
author to self-defeat, petulance or disingenuousness. Thus,
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instead of claiming that the Scots lawyer is "impenitently
unversed in the English law," he could often strengthen his differentiation of the Scots law by using his Oxford training to
explain the English law rather than damn it. Again, it was monstrous of Viscount Montgomery to refer to parts of Scotland as
"the tribal areas"; but the correspondence column of a newspaper is a fitter place for the rebuke he merits than page 592 of
the present Commentary. Lastly, when the author says that
"civil jury trial ...has outstayed its welcome" 7 he really should
have referred to the recent Scottish Commission which voted to
retain it.
These are minor criticisms. The book is a remarkable one,
and will appeal to all who oppose the view that lawyers are conscripts to dullness, and that the tartan of a colorful personality
must never peep from the dun of the academic. The further
merits of this book may be inferred ex contrario from the indecorous and savage review by one of the author's colleagues
printed in 26 Modern Law Review 466 (1963).
J. A. Weir*
7. P. 588.
*Fellow of Trinity College and Assistant Lecturer. University of Cambridge.

